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INSURER'S LIABILITY ABOVE THE
POLICY LIMIT-INTEREST
A large number of contemporary insurance contracts contain
what the industry and the courts have labeled "standard clauses."'
One such clause promises that the insurer will pay for the insured
"all sums [or] all expenses incurred by the company, all costs
taxed against the insured in any such suit and all interest accruing
after entry of judgment until the company has paid ... such part
of such judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's
liability thereon .... -2 This Comment will consider the liability
1. The standard liability insurance policy provides that the insurer
shall pay "all interest accruing after entry of judgment until the company
has paid or tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as
does not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon." 2 R. LoNe,
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 9.01-9.02 (1966); "Indemnity and liability
insurance policies now usually provide for the payment on behalf of the
insured of 'all sums' which he shall become legally obligated to pay by
reason of a risk within the terms of the policy." 15 G. CoucH, INSURANCE
2d § 56:9 (1964); "Under most policies, the insurer is liable for interest on
judgments rendered against the insured, even though the amount renders
the total recovery in excess of the policy limits." 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4899 (1962).
2. See, e.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 260
F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958) (Insurer agreed to pay "all sums" which the
insured might become legally obligated to pay); River Valley Cartage Co.
v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959) (Insurer
agreed to pay "all interest accruing after entry of judgment"); Underwood
v. Buzby, 236 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1956) (Insurer agreed to pay "all interest
accruing after entry of judgment"); 2 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
§§ 9.01-9.02 (1966); 15 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 56:9 (1964); 8 J. APPLE-
MAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4899 (1962). The clause cited is
most commonly used in contemporary contracts. Ramsey, Interest On
Judgments Under Liability Insurance Policies, 1957 INS. L.J. 407; accord,
Pigg v. International Indemnity Co., 86 Cal. App. 671, 261 P. 486 (1927)
where a variation on the standard clause was included in the contract
as follows:
[P]rovided, however, that the company's liability shall in no event
exceed [policy limit] for damages for such injuries to any one
person. And will in addition (1) defend (certain suits); (2) pay
(certain expenses) - (b) pay all taxed costs; (c) pay all interest ac-
cruing upon such part of such damages awarded by judgment as is
not in excess of the company's limit of indemnity as above defined.
Id. at 675, 261 P. at 488; In Consolidated Underwriters v. Richards' Adm'r,
276 Ky. 275, 124 S.W.2d 54 (1939) another variation of the "standard
clause" was included in the contract:
In addition to these limits the Underwriters will also pay expense
incurred by them in connection with the investigation and adjust-
ment of claims under insuring clauses one and two; all costs taxed
against the subscriber in any legal proceding while being defended
by the Underwriters on behalf of the subscriber... ; interest
accruing after entry of judgment upon such part thereof as shall not
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of the insurer to pay interest which, when combined with the
principal recovery granted, places the insurer's total liability at a
figure which exceeds its maximum contractual liability.
Every state today has a statute allowing recovery of interest3
and the vast majority have statutes regulating the maximum rate
that may be charged. 4 The existence of regulatory maximums in
be in excess of the Underwriters' liability as limited in insuring
clauses one and two....
Id. at 285, 124 S.W.2d at 59. In any of the three clauses cited it will be
noted that the insurer promises to pay to the injured third party, on be-
half of the insured, interest on the judgment, Notice, however, the crucial
distinction between the wording used in the clause cited in the text and
the two clauses cited immediately above. In the clauses cited here the
insurer has carefully limited its liability to interest on the policy limits or
the judgment whichever is the smaller figure. In the clause set forth in
the text, on the other hand, the obligation of the insurer is expressed in
terms of "all" interest. Because there are situations where the judgment is
greater than the policy limits, the insurer's limitation of which figure shall
be used in the computation of interest is significant.
3. ALA. CODE tit. 9 § 63 (1957); ALASKA STAT. tit. 9, § 09.30.070 (1962);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 12-347 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 29-124 (1956); CAL. CODE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1033 (West Supp. 1967); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 73-1-2 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-349 (1967); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301 (1965); D.C. CODE tit. 28, § 2706 (1967); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 55.03 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 110-304 (Supp. 1967); HAWAII REV.
LAWS ch. 191, § 191-2 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-22-104 (1967); ILL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 6 (1966); IND. STAT. ANN. § 19-12-102 (1964); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 625.21 (1950); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 16-204 (1964); KENTUCKY
REV. STAT. § 360.040 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 4203 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ch.
129, § 4 (1954); MD. RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE, rule 624 (1963); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 8 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6455 (1948); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 549-09 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 36 (1942); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§ 512.160 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-8622 (1967); NEB. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-103 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.130 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 524: 1-a (1963); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-1 (1964); N.M. STAT. § 50-6-4
(1953); N.Y. CIvIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 5002 (McKinney 1963); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-7 (1965); N. DAK. CODE § 28-20-34 (1960); OHmO REV.
CODE § 1343.01 (1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 274 (1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 82.010 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 781 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 6-26-1 (1957); S.C. CODE § 10-1605 (1962); S. DAK. CODE § 38.0108 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-110 (1964); TEX. CIVIL STAT. art. 5072 (1962);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-4 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. § 2431 (1958); VA. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 495 (1950); VIRGIN ISLE CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 426 (1957); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.40 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 56, 56-31 (1966);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 270.67 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 478 (1957).
4. ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 60 (1957); ALASKA STAT. tit. 9, § 09.30.070
(1962); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1201 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-602
(1967); CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (1967); Colorado does not have a statute
limiting the maximum rate that may be charged; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-4 (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 2301 (1965); D.C. CODE § 28-3302
(1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.10 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 57-112 (Supp.
1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 191-7 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-22-105
(1967); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 74, § 4 (1966); IND. STAT. ANN. § 19-2008 (1964);
the statutes illustrates that although Medieval aversions to in-
terest5 may have been discarded, usury is still condemned.
The insurer and the insured are tied to one another by the
insurance policy, a contract which sets forth both the maximum
liability of the insurer and the consideration which the insured
must pay. Generally, liability is not imposed on the insurer
above its policy limits.6 Exceptions arise where the contract ex-
pressly provides for such additional liability or where the court
implies it.7
Suits against an insurer alleging liability above the policy
limit for interest payments must involve fact situations in which
all the following elements are present:
IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.7 (1966); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 16-203 (1964); KEN-
TUCKY REV. STAT. § 360.020 (1963); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2924 (1968); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 9, § 3086 (1954); MD. CIVIL CODE art. 49, § 3 (1957); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 90 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 438.51 (1948); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37 (1942); MO. STAT. ANN.
§ 408.030 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 47-126 (1967); NEB. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-113 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 99.050 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 336:1 (1955); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-6 (1964); N.M. STAT. § 50-6-16
(1953); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 377 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2
(1965); N.DAK. CODE § 47-14-09 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE § 1309.3 (1962);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 266 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 66.205 (1965); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 5 (1967); R.I. has a possible maximum of 30% of
amount actually received by borrower on loan over $50.00. Smaller loans
accumulate interest at 5% per month for six months plus 2Y% per month
thereafter. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4 (1956); S.C. CODE § 8-3 (1962); S.
DAK. CODE § 38.0109 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1604 (1964); TEX. CIVIL
STAT. art. 5071 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-2 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 31 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 6-346 (1950); VIRGIN ISLES CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 426 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.030 (1962); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 4627 (1966); WIs. STAT ANN. § 115.08 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
13-477 (1957).
5. For numerous reasons ultimately founded in the dominant ecclesi-
astical disposition of the Middle Ages, interest was not allowed on a judg-
ment or verdict under the early common law:
In a primative agricultural society the weak and necessitous are
at the mercy of the shrewd and unscrupulous. The commercial
borrower, on the other hand, needs money to make money and
should be treated accordingly. In general realization of this, the
Roman Law permitted recompense for failure to repay. From
this we derive the name itself. (Id quod interest, that which is
between).
Stein v. Delano, 121 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1941); see 30 AM. JuR. Interest
§ 3 (1958); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100-112 (2d ed.
1926); cf. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 225 (3d
ed. 1909).
6. But where the insurer breaches his duty of good faith in dealing
with the third party for the insured, it may be liable even in excess of its
policy limits. Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223
(1957); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966).
7. The standard clause is the basis on which the liability of the in-
surer for interest above its policy limits rests. Some courts have considered
that the clause expressed the additional liability. Powell v. T.A. & C. Taxi,
104 N.H. 428, 188 A.2d 654 (1963). Other courts have considered that addi-
tional liability of the insurer for interest above the policy limits must be
the product of the court's implication. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Winget,
197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952). For examples of the wording of the standard
clause: see note 8 infra.
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A. The insured must be legally obligated to pay a
third party injured by his actions. Such liability on the
part of the insured must exist in such a manner that his
claim for reimbursement under the insurance contract is
not precluded by the terms of the policy.8
B. The insured must have a policy of liability insur-
ance which includes the "standard clause" or wording to
similar effect.
C. Either of two situations regarding the judgment
or verdict in relation to the policy limits of the contract
must occur:
1. The verdict or judgment taken against the in-
sured must be greater than the policy limits of the con-
tract.9
or
2. The verdict or judgment is less than the policy
limits of the contract; however, when the interest is added
to the principal recovery the total exceeds the policy
limit.'0
If the conditions in A and B are met, and either of the two situations
in C also occur, the insurer faces a total liability which exceeds the
maximum limitation on the face of its contract. The conditions set
forth in A and B commonly occur.' Similarly, the situation out-
lined in 1 of C occurs frequently in practice. For example, if the in-
sured has a contract with a policy limit of $5,000 and is subjected
to a judgment for any amount over that figure, $10,000 for exam-
ple, then the total liability to the insurer may rise above the
$5,000 limit when and if interest is included in or allowed on
8. There are a number of situations in which the insurer will be re-
lieved from its liability under the contract despite the existence of an
accident in which the insured is at fault. The most common example in-
volves fraud by the insured in securing the contract. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.
v. Pratt, 130 Cal. App. 2d 151, 278 P.2d 489 (1955); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Lanzisero, 119 N.J. Eq. 166, 181 A. 170 (1935). In addition, if the policy
provides for cooperation by the insured with the insurer after the acci-
dent, and the insured fails to meet this requirement, the insurer may be
relieved of its obligation under the contract. 15 G. CouCH, INSURANCE
2d § 51:171-51:197 (1967). Where, however, the policy is of the assigned
risk type, the obligations of the insurer may be so deeply rooted in the
right of the state to protect motorists that even non-cooperation in the
face of a policy that requires cooperation may mean liability for the insurer.
Wilkerson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 119 F. Supp. 383 (4th Cir. 1953).
9. See, e.g., Underwood v. Buzby, 236 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1956); River
Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 242, 161 N.E.2d
101 (1959); Kraynick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 296, 193 A.2d
419 (1963).
10. Although there does not appear to be a case on this point it is
apparent that the situation could occur.
11. See note 1 supra.
the judgment. 2
The allowance of interest either in or on the judgment is gov-
erned by local statutes13 and the actions of the insurer in relation-
ship to those statutes.14 If, for example, the insurer fails to tender
or pay into court the amount of the judgment in a reasonable time
after entry of judgment and if the state allows interest from the
date of the judgment, the insurer must pay interest until a legal
tender is made or, of course, until its liability is paid. 15
After determining that the insurer faces liability above the
policy limit, a court must answer three questions: from what time
will interest be allowed; at what rate will the interest be com-
puted; and what figure will be used to calculate the interest?
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST-FRoM WHAT TIME?
Since interest allowed on a judgment is directly proportional
to the time span during which the obligation runs, its calculation
will depend upon a decision as to when the interest will begin to
accumulate. Because the obligation will cease when principal due
plus interest is tendered or paid into court,16 the point at which
12. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Home Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 658, 142 S.E.2d 626
(1965); Coventry v. Steve Koren Inc., 1 Ohio App. 2d 385, 205 N.E.2d 18
(1965).
13. Twelve jurisdictions have the clerk of the court add interest to the
principal in order to attain the proper level of judgment: ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1201 (1967); California's statute is typical:
The clerk or the judge shall include in the judgment, or any part
of a judgment, rendered up by him based upon a claim of action in
contract where the claim was liquidated, interest on the verdict or
decision of the court from the date prior to the entry of judgment
as may have been fixed by the court pursuant to subdivision (b) of
section 3287 of the Civil Code, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or ascertained. In any other case and where the court de-
termines that interest should not be recovered from a date prior to
the entry of judgment under subdivision (b) of section 3287 of the
Civil Code, the clerk or the judge shall include in the judgment en-
tered up by him, any interest on the verdict or the decision of the
court, from the time it was rendered or made, and the costs, if the
same shall have been taxed or ascertained.
CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROCEDURE, ch. 1230, § 2 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-
22-105 (1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.7 (1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01
(1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 47-126 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 336:1 (1955); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 877 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24-2 (1965); S.C. CODE § 8-3 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-2 (1962);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 115.08 (1958).
14. If the insurer pays its policy limits into court or tenders that
amount to the successful third party before its liability is established for
interest on the judgment, the insurer is relieved from liability for interest.
See Hafer v. Schauer, 429 Pa. 289, 239 A.2d 785 (1968).
15. Liberty National Ins. Co. v. Eberhart, 398 P,2d 997 (Alaska 1965);
Germer v. Public Service Mutual Ins. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 137, 238 A.2d 713
(1967); Baucum v. Great American Ins. Co., 364 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963).
16. As a general rule the tender must include everything to which
the creditor is entitled; a tender of less is nugatory. River Valley Cartage
Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959). If
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the obligation for interest terminates is clear. The determination
of the time during which interest accumulates is therefore
essentially one involving the date from which interest shall be
allowed.
The majority of jurisdictions have enacted statutes which make
explicit the time from which interest shall be allowed. In twenty-
five states interest is allowed only from the date judgment is
entered. 17 Seventeen states have statutes allowing interest from
the rendition of verdict.18 Seven states do not have statutes regu-
lating the time from which interest is allowed. 19 Of the seven,
however, five have cases indicating a preference for the majority
(from the judgment) view.
20
When a statute allows interest from the rendition of verdict
and the insurer has, through the "standard clause," promised to
pay "all" interest, it would appear that the liability of the insurer
has been established. Other provisions of the "clause," however,
limit the insurer's liability to interest which accumulates after
the tender does not include all of the interest to which the judgment creditor
is entitled it is nugatory. M'Dowell v. Glass, 4 Watts 389 (1835); Engle-
hart v. Cassat, 305 Pa. 117, 157 A. 256 (1931).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 63 (1957); ALASKA STAT. tit. 9, § 09.30.070 (1962);
ASK. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 29-124 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. § 73-1-2 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-349 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.03 (1943);
ILL. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 6 (1966); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 16-204 (1964);
KENTUCKY REV. STAT. § 360.040 (1963); MD. RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 624
(1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6455 (1948); MISS. CODE ANN. § 36 (1942);
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 512.160 (1959); NEB. STAT. ANN. § 45-103 (1943);. NEv.
REV. STAT. § 17.130 (1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 274 (1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 82.010 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-1 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-14-110 (1964); TEX. CIVIL STAT. art. 5072 (1962); VIRGIN ISLE CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 426 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.110 (1962); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 478 (1957); HAWAII REV. LAWS ch 191, § 191-2 (1955); D.C.
CODE tit. 28, § 2706 (1967).
18. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 12-347 (1967); CAL. CODE CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 1033 (West Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 110-304 (Supp.
1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-22-104 (1967); IND. STAT. ANN. § 19-12-102
(1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 625.21 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235,
§ 8 (1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549-09 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-
8622 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:1-a (1963); N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE
LAW AND RULES § 5002 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-7 (1965);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 781 (1967); S.C. CODE § 10-1605 (1962); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 15-1-4 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 56, § 6-31 (1966); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 270.67 (1958).
19. Delaware, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota and Vermont.
20. Delaware: Haas v. Haas, 36 Del. Ch. 1, 124 A.2d 7 (1956); N.
Dakota: Grier v. Tjaden, 84 N.W.2d 582 (N.Dak. 1957); Ohio: Carle v.
Courtright, 69 Ohio App. 69, 40 N.E.2d 431 (1941); S. Dakota: Griebel v.
Ruden, 62 S.D. 469, 253 N.W. 447 (1934); Vermont: United States v. Globe
Remodeling Co., 196 F. Supp. 652 (2d Cir. 1961).
the entry of the judgment.21 There is, therefore, an apparent con-
flict between the wording of the "standard clause" and statutes
granting interest from the time of verdict.
In Hafer v. Schauer"2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the
insurer's liability for interest limited in accordance with the terms
of the "standard clause." The jury rendered a verdict for the
plaintiff in excess of the policy limits in March, 1964. In Novem-
ber of 1965 the insurer, after several unsuccessful attempts to pay
plaintiff less than the amounts plaintiff believed to be due, paid its
policy limits plus interest thereon into court. The crucial point
of the case, however, was that the plaintiff neglected to have judg-
ment entered on the verdict until April of 1965, a full six months
after the insurer paid its policy limits into court. The majority gave
the "standard clause" a literal reading and held the insurer relieved
from liability for any interest.
23
Because the decision relieved the insurer from liability for
interest, the Pennsylvania statute 24 (allowing interest on verdicts
from rendition of verdict) must be considered as creating a liability
for interest between the judgment and the verdict only to the in-
sured. The court noted, however, that the result of the Hafer
case should be limited to situations where the insurer's total lia-
bility was greater than the contract maximum because of the in-
surer's assumption of interest liability:
[In] the instant case we are confronted with the issue
of determining an insurer's liability for interest when the
interest allegedly due and owing plus the principal amount
of the verdict exceed the face amount of the liability cover-
age under the policy. In these instances only, it is suffi-
cient to say that an insurer is not liable for any interest
in excess of the policy limits of liability unless and to the
extent it has contracted with its insured to do otherwise.
2 5
In addition, the court noted that:
[Absent] a situation wherein interest due plus the prin-
21. The wording of the standard clause is to the effect that the in-
surer will pay "all interest accruing after entry of judgment." United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hotkins, 170 N.Y.S.2d 441, 8 Misc. 2d 296
(1957); Nichols v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 131
N.W.2d 131 (1961).
22. 429 Pa. 289, 239 A.2d 785 (1968).
23. Id. at 292, 239 A.2d at 788.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 781 (1967):
From and after the passage of this act it shall be lawful for any
person or parties, in whose favor a verdict may be rendered for a
specific sum of money, to collect and receive interest upon such sum
from the date of the verdict: and every general judgment entered
upon such verdict, whether by a court of general jurisdiction, or by
the supreme court, shall be deemed and held to be a judgment
for the sum found by the verdict, with interest thereon from the
date of such finding: Provided that nothing in this act contained
shall prevent any court from directing special verdicts, or entering
special judgments whenever the same shall be deemed just and
proper.
25. 429 Pa. at 292, 239 A.2d at 787.
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cipal amount of a verdict exceed applicable policy limits
of liability, the insurer is liable for any and all interest
accruing from the date of the rendition of an adverse ver-
dict to the entry of the judgment thereon. In this respect,
insurance carriers are subject to the identical liability for
interest as any other party defendant who has received an
adverse verdict.
26
The dissent argued that the statute "makes the words 'judg-
ment' and 'verdict' synonymous for [purposes of establishing the
insurer's liability for interest]. That these words have different
meanings in other contexts is irrelevant. '27 The Pennsylvania
statute provides: "[Every] general judgment entered upon a
verdict . . . shall be deemed and held to be a judgment for the
sum found by the verdict, with interest thereon from the date of
the finding. '28  The wording of the statute clearly distinguishes
judgment and verdict. Judgment consists of two elements: the
principal amount of the verdict and interest thereon. Verdict, on
the other hand, consists only of the principal recovery allowed. The
distinction between "judgment" and "verdict" is temporal in na-
ture; verdict precedes judgment. At least in this respect the major-
ity opinion, which emphasizes that there is a difference, is the
stronger of the two theories.
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST-AT WHAT RATE?
Although parties to a contract may specify the rate of interest
on that contract, 2 some jurisdictions hold that a judgment on such
a contract will bear interest at the legal rate in place of the desig-
nated rate.30 Other states allow the stated rate in the contract to
govern the legal rate so long as such rate is not in excess of the
legal maximum.3' Every state has a legal rate 2 and the vast
26. Id. at 292, 239 A.2d at 787.
27. Id. at 298, 239 A.2d at 790.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 781 (1967).
29. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa.
1938), aff'd, 315 U.S. 289 (1941); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 76 F. Supp. 976
(2d Cir. 1944); Dugan v. Forster, 104 Cal. App. 117, 285 P. 384 (1930);
Gromley v. Eison, 189 Ga. 259, 5 S.E.2d 643 (1939); Blakesles's Storage
Warehouses v. Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 17 N.E.2d 1 (1938); Ratner v. Hill, 270
Mass. 249, 170 N.E. 69 (1930); Merchant's National Bank v. State Bank, 172
Minn. 24, 214 N.W. 750 (1927).
30. Hiller v. Matheny, 81 Colo. 459, 256 P. 10 (1927); Rockland-Atlas
Nat'l Bank v. Murphy, 329 Mass. 755, 110 N.E.2d 638 (1952); Merchants
Finance Co. v. Goldweber, 138 Ohio St. 474, 35 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
31. Greer v. Greer, 56 Ariz. 394, 108 P.2d 398 (1940); Farrand v. Far-
rand, 246 Iowa 488, 67 N.W.2d 20 (1954); Rafert v. Fed. Farm Mortgage
Corp., 152 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1945); Indus. Loan Corp. v. Janik, 28 Pa. D.
& C. 513 (1936); Smith v. Deane, 125 Wash. 368, 216 P. 6 (1923); Turk v.
majority have maximums.13  Since insurance contracts do not
ordinarily specify the rate of interest on judgments,3 4 the legal
rate controls.33
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST-ON WHAT FIGURE?
This question arises only when the judgment exceeds the pol-
icy maximum. In those instances where judgment is less than
the policy limits calculations for the computation of interest are
made on the lesser of judgment and policy limit.38
The Entire Judgment
The reasoning most frequently employed by courts in holding
the insurer liable on the entire judgment is that the insurer has
control over the litigation (hereafter called the "control" argument).
In standard liability insurance contracts the insurer reserves dis-
cretion to accept or reject offers of compromise or settlement.37 In
McKinney, 132 W. Va. 460, 52 S.E.2d 388 (1949); contra, Am. Bankers Fin.
Co. v. Majeski, 17 Pa. D. & C. 668 (1932).
32. See note 3 supra.
33. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 1-5 (1967) (legal rate is 6%
and the maximum rate is also 6%); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 99.040-99.050 (1963)
(legal rate is 7% and the maximum rate is 12%); the majority of jurisdic-
tions have a legal rate of 6%, see note 4 supra.
34. See, e.g., Century Realty Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accidental &
Plate Glass Ins. Co., 179 Mo. App. 123, 161 S.W. 624 (1913); Hopkins v.
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 76, 121 N.E. 465 (1918); Clark v. Nat'l Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 145 Tex. 575, 200 S.W.2d 820 (1947); State ex rel. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 309, 199 N.W. 954 (1924).
35. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Gas Co., 113 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1940),
rev'd on other grounds, 314 U.S. 63 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 714
(1941); Hiller v. Matheny, 81 Colo. 459, 256 P. 10 (1927); Rockland-Atlas
Nat'l Bank v. Murphy, 329 Mass. 755, 110 N.E.2d 638 (1952); Merchants
Fin. Co. v. Goldweber, 138 Ohio St. 474, 35 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
36. The determination as to which figure will be used to calculate the
interest is vitally important. Suppose, for example, that the insured had a
coverage of $5,000 maximum and a judgment was entered against the in-
sured for $100,000. The appeal of the insurer was delayed for two years at
the end of which time the judgment below was affirmed. Assume further
that the contract includes the "standard clause" or wording to similar effect.
If the insurer is liable for interest on the entire judgment, including the
portion above the policy limits, it would have to pay $12,360 ($100,000 x
6% x 6%). On the other hand, if the liability of the insurer is limited to
the policy limit of $5,000 its liability for interest would have been merely
$618 ($5,000 x 6% x 6%). The rate used is the Pennsylvania legal rate ex-
pressed in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4(2) §§ 1-5 (1967). See, e.g., Underwood v.
Buzby, 236 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1956) (policy limit of $25,000, judgment for
$60,000); River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d
242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959) (policy limit of $50,000, judgment for $175,000);
Mayberry v. Home Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 658, 142 S.E.2d 626 (1965) (policy limit
of $5,000 judgment for $79,500); Kraynick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 80 N.J.
Super. 296, 193 A.2d 419 (1963) (policy limit of $10,000, judgment for
$62,000); Coventry v. Steve Koren Inc., 1 Ohio App. 2d 385, 205 N.E.2d 18
(1965) (policy limit of $10,000, judgment for $60,000).
37. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bowling Green Gaslight Co., 150 Ky. 732,
150 S.W. 994 (1912); E. SAWYER, AUTOMOBmE LIABILITY INSURANCE 73-74
(1936); see, e.g., cases supporting and utilizing the "control" theory; Under-
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addition, the usual contract provides that if the insured settles or
accepts compromise offers he does so at his own cost.a8 The in-
surer need not accept an obligation to settle a claim which arises
out of an agreement to which it was not a party. These rights of
the insurer, when combined, give it virtually complete "control"
over the litigation. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bowling Green Gaslight
Co.80 the court, after quoting lengthy provisions of the disputed
contract, stated: "[the provisions of the disputed contract] give
the insurance company complete control of the settlement of all
claims. . . that are presented against the insured.
40
The "control" theory is grounded on a judicial recognition of
the prjudice suffered by the insured as his liability for interest
grow steadily larger while the insurer appeals or engages in dila-
tory tactics of some other nature.4 1 To protect the insured's in-
terests, courts have initiated and upheld the policy that with con-
trol of the litigation goes the accompanying reasponsibility for in-
terest that will accumulate if the appeal is unsuccessful. 42
The "control" theory presupposes objection by the insured to
the insurer's decision not to settle or to continue the litigation in
appeal. Objection by the insured is, however, considerably weak-
ened if the insured has read the contract and is therefore aware of
the objectionable clause before entering the contract. This line of
reasoning is strengthened by a presumption, after delivery and
acceptance of the policy, that the insured has read the contract.
48
The "control" clauses are, however, standard in the vast major-
ity of insurance contracts. 44 When a prospective insured begins
wood v. Buzby, 236 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1956); Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Eber-
hart, 398 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1965); River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-
Security Ins. Co., 17 Il. 2d 242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959); Mayberry v. Home
Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 658, 142 S.E.2d 626 (1965); Powell v. T.A. & C. Taxi, 104
N.H. 428, 188 A.2d 654 (1963); Kraynick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 80 N.J.
Super. 296, 193 A.2d 419 (1963); Coventry v. Steve Koren Inc., 1 Ohio App.
2d 385, 205 N.E.2d 18 (1965).
38. River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d
242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959); Powell v. T.A. & C. Taxi, 104 N.H. 428, 188
A.2d 654 (1963).
39. 150 Ky. 732, 150 S.W. 994 (1912).
40. Id. at 734, 150 S.W. at 995.
41. Powell v. T.A. and C. Taxi, 104 N.H. 428, 188 A.2d 654 (1963):
"Delay which causes interest to run, and the cost thereof, should rest on
the shoulders of the insurer who has complete control of the litigation
and settlement." Id. at 431, 188 A.2d at 655.
42. River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d
242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959); Powell v. T.A. & C. Taxi, 104 N.H. 428, 188 A.2d
654 (1963).
43. Heikes v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 171 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1948); Fisher
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 107 N.H. 101, 218 A.2d 62 (1965).
44. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bowling Green Gaslight Co., 150
his search for an insurer his options regarding the control of the
insurer are limited. Whichever insurer he chooses will include the
control clauses. The insured's actual or presumed knowledge of
the insurer's right to control the litigation in opposition to the
wishes of the insured is, therefore, meaningless.
45
A second consideration sustaining the insurer's liability for
interest on the entire judgment was expressed in River Valley Car-
tage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co.4 16 The defendant insurance
company issued a policy with a maximum coverage of $50,000 and
the plaintiff was successful in obtaining a judgment for $175,000.
The "standard clause" was included in the contract. The insurer
paid its policy limits to the administrator of the deceased plaintiff's
estate and the plaintiff appealed for interest. In holding the in-
surer liable for interest on the entire judgment the court cited
case authority both for and against holding the insurer liable and
then stated: "It might be enough to say that the ambiguity
evidenced by this division of opinion should be construed against
the insurer. ' 47 The difficulty in this rule of construction lies in
determining what constitutes ambiguity.4 In the River Valley
case, although the court rejected this rule, a fairly objective method
of recognizing ambiguity was utilized. By looking to conflicting
interpretations given the wording of the standard clause the court
was able to say with certainty that ambiguity existed. This
method has limited utility since it can be applied only where the
cause of action has been previously litigated, 4 or where the court
purporting to use the standard is not a federal court bound to
state decisions.50
In Highway Cas. Co. v. Johnston51 the Florida Supreme Court
utilized the ambiguity theory in a slightly different manner than
that used in River Valley. It reasoned that the insurer should be
liable for interest on the entire judgment because:
Everyone knows that the insurance field is highly com-
petitive. Had the appellant entertained any doubt with
Ky. 732, 150 S.W. 994 (1912); E. SAWYER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
73-74 (1936): "Many jurisdictions have now adopted so-called standard
forms of policies concerning various kinds of insurance such as fire, life,
accident and health, and cotton gin insurance." 1 G. COUCH, INSURANCE
2d §§ 3:7-3:17 (1959).
45. E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bowling Green Gaslight Co., 150 Ky.
732, 150 S.W. 994 (1912); accord, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
46. 17 Ill. 2d 242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959).
47. Id. at 245, 161 N.E.2d at 104.
48. See Powell v. T.A. & C. Taxi, 104 N.H. 428, 188 A.2d 654 (1963)
(based on the same wording); contra, Sampson v. Century Indem. Co., 8
Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434 (1937).
49. E.g., Sampson v. Century Indem. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434
(1937).
50. See, e.g., Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir.
1952); Morgan v. Graham, 228 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1956).
51. 104 So. 2d 734 (Florida 1958).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
reference to its obligation upon the subject under discus-
sion it could have revised the verbiage of its contract before
issuance thereof.
52
Is this not the rule which construes ambiguities most strongly
against the maker in disguise? To state that because the insurer
failed to anticipate possible litigation over wording in its contract
and revise the contract accordingly is only to state that any am-
biguity will be construed most strongly against the maker.
The Johnston and the River Valley decisions exemplify the
ambiguity theory or rule holding the insurer responsible for in-
terest on the entire judgment, but neither case would be sound
if it rested only upon such reasoning. As Williston commented:
"Though the expressions in the cases are numerous that where
language is used in a contract is clear and unambiguous, there is
no opportunity for interpretation or construction, yet these ex-
pressions themselves need interpretation."5 3
The rule construing ambiguities in contracts most strongly
against the maker does not stand as the sole reason for holding
the insurer liable. In Powell v. T.A. & C. Taxi54 the cause of action
arose out of an automobile accident. Following a successful court
action the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $20,000 when the pol-
icy limit of the insurer was $10,000. The standard clause was
included in the contract. Counsel stipulated that the issue was
whether the insurer was liable for interest on the $10,000 policy
limit or on the entire judgment of $20,000? The court, with refer-
ence to the wording of the standard clause stated: "[The] phrase
all interest does not connote the thought of some interest, or part
of the interest on the judgment but rather all interest on the judg-
ment whatever its amount in relation to the policy limit.
'55
The court's interpretation is clear and to the point. The word-
ing of the standard clause is not, however, always accepted as in-
dicative of clarity.8  For example, a 1958 decision of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals found the wording of the clause to be
clear and unambiguous, but held the insurer's liability for interest
limited to the policy limit.57 The result is diametrically opposed to
Powell. The existence of cases contrary to Powell does not de-
52. Id. at 736.
53. 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 609 (1936).
54. 104 N.H. 428, 188 A.2d 654 (1963).
55. Id. at 430, 188 A.2d at 656.
56. See, e.g., Sampson v. Century Indem. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d
434 (1937).
57. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 361 (10th
Cir. 1958).
stroy the persuasiveness of the majority's reasoning. The insurer
used the inclusive term "all" in place of some other adjective to
describe its liability for interest, and this factor weighs heavily
against the insurer seeking to avoid liability.
Some courts have buttressed the arguments made in Powell
and River Valley with a statement that the draftsmen of the
clause intended to allow the insured coverage for interest on the
entire judgment."8 Cases citing the intention of the draftsmen
have centered on an article in the 1957 Insurance Law Journal in
which the author states:
[T] he wording with respect to payment of interest in
the New Family Automobile Policy has been restated, in
order that it may be entirely clear that all interest on the
entire amount of any judgment is payable by the insurer
until the insurer has paid or tendered or deposited in
court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the
insurer's liability thereon.5 9
A letter distributed by the National Bureau of Casualty Under-
writers to its affiliates was cited in support of the author's con-
tentions.6 0 There is, therefore, authority for the proposition that
the companies utilizing the standard clause intended the insurer
to be liable for interest on the entire judgment.
Additional reasoning set forth in the River Valley decision for
the extension of the insurer's liability for interest on the entire
judgment was Stated as follows:
The phrase referring to interest uses the term judgment
without qualification while in the same clause the phrase
limiting the duration of the liability for interest refers to
"such part of the judgment as does not exceed the limit
of the company's liability thereon." Obviously the insurer
knew how to qualify the term "judgment" to achieve the
result that it urges. It did not do so.6 1
Such reasoning appears to be sound in that it is certain that the
wording used indicates the insurer's ability to qualify terms when
necessary. To require adequate "qualification" of all terms would,
however, place a great strain on draftsmen and generate a great deal
of unnecessary verbiage behind which objectionable clauses may be
hidden. Such a result should perhaps be discouraged to achieve
the end of understandable contracts and thus an informed insured.
The argument is persuasive insofar as it reiterates two theories
previously discussed: the ambiguity therory, 2 and the intention
58. Mayberry v. Home Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 658,-142 S.E2d 626 (1965);
Doty v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 186 So. 2d 328 (La. 1966).
59. Ramsey, Interest on Judgments Under Liability Insurance Poli-
cies, 1957 INS. L.J. 407, 411 (emphasis added).
60. Letter set forth in Hafer v. Schauer, 429 Pa. 289, 239 A.2d 785
(1968) (dissenting opinion).
61. River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d
242, 161 N.E.2d 101 (1959).




The following reasoning may be advanced in further support
of the maximum liability to the insurer. Some states have fi-
nancial responsibility statutes whereby a prospective motorist
must either demonstrate financial responsibility in a prescribed
minimum amount or have insurance to cover the minimum.6 4 The
purpose of these statutes is manifestly the protection of injured
persons from financially irresponsible motorists. Stated in another
but perhaps less palatable manner, the purpose of the statute is to
allow for the full compensation of plaintiffs. 5 The contract of
insurance thus takes on aspects of a third party beneficiary con-
tract, the benefited class being other motorists and pedestrians
within the sphere of vehicle operation.
Assuming the insurance contract is partly a third party bene-
ficiary contract, the injured party ought to be able to collect in-
terest from the insurer in those instances where the insured is judg-
ment-proof. If the injured party cannot collect from the insured
it seems just to allow him recovery from the insurer. In support
of this result it can be reasoned that the contract exists because of
the state's power to regulate motorists and the insurance industry
through its police powers. The contract is not therefore, limited to
outlining the rights and obligations between insurer and insured.
Thus, the rights of all involved parties must be considered in deter-
mining the insurer's liabilities.
The Policy Limit
The leading case supporting the limitation of the insurer's
liability is Sampson v. Century Indem. Co. 6 The policy maximum
63. See note 56 supra.
64. 2 R. LONG, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 14.18 (1966):
The general rule is that unless a policy can be construed as creat-
ing an independent right of action in the injured person, his right to
recover is subject to any defense the insurer might have against
the insured.
An exception to the general rule arises where the liability
policy has been issued in compliance with a statute having as its
purpose the protection of the public.
Id. at § 14.18. 12 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 45:700 (1964) ("Many states
have enacted statutes, known as financial responsibility laws which are
intended to discourage careless driving or to mitigate its consequenes
by providing proof of financial responsibility as a condition of the granting
of a driver's license. . . ."); 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4295 (1962) ("Financial responsibility statutes have been passed in many
states ... to secure the solvency of operators upon the highways of those
states, and to guarantee their ability to discharge judgments arising out of
accidents in which they might be involved.")
65. 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434 (1937).
66. Id. at 480, 66 P.2d at 438.
was $10,000 and the "standard clause" was included in the contract.
After the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $20,000 the insurer
paid its policy limits of $10,000 plus interest thereon to the plain-
tiff. In holding the insurer absolved from liability for interest
other than that paid on the policy limits the court stated:
In our opinion the only fair and reasonable inference is
that the company was to pay interest after judgment only
upon that part of the judgment for which it was liable.
So construed there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the
terms of the policy and therefore the rule contended for by
the appellant [construction of ambiguities against the
maker] has no application
67
The court here illustrates the reason why the rule of construction
has been condemned. By stating its opinion first and subsequently
reaching a conclusion as to the ambiguity the court has emascu-
lated what little life could be attributed to the rule. The court
was not in a position to look to other jurisdictions for support as the
Illinois court did in River Valley because this decision was the first
to consider the effect of the standard clause on the insurer's lia-
bility for interest above its policy limits. The determination as to
ambiguity was therefore made on the facts. In making that deter-
mination the court set precedent for practically all of the cases
supporting the limitation of the insurer's liability to the policy
limits.68
The Sampson court also stated that: "During the delay, the
insured had the use of the money due on that part of the judgment
for which the company was not liable." 69 The court then concluded
that the liability of the insurer should be limited to the interest
which results from a computation with the policy limits as a base
figure. The court's decision was based upon the defendant's inter-
ference with the plaintiff's right to live without infliction of in-
jury. This right in the plaintiff was disturbed by the defendant
and thus the court considered that the defendant-insured had the
use of the money above the policy limits of the contract. The
central question here is the insurer's liability for interest; the cause
of action which results from a disturbance or a taking of a right
from one person by another is merely a prerequisite to the insurer's
liability, not the central issue. In stating that the insured had the
use of the money the court actually states nothing except that
there has been a cause of action created by the insured's actions.
67. Following Sampson v. Century Indem. Ins. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66
P.2d 434 (1937), the Ninth Circuit in Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Winget, 197
F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952) and the Tenth Circuit in Morgan v. Graham, 228
F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1956) accepted the reasoning of Sampson without con-
sidering the logic therein. See also, Crook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241 (1960); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v.
Indem. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958).
68. Sampson v. Century Indem. Ins. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434
(1937).
69. 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952).
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Therefore, this theory does not support limitation of the insurer's
liability to the policy limits.
In Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Winget 70 the court, in holding the
insurer's liability limited, purported to add reasoning for this side
of the dichotomy:
If we hold an insurer liable for interest, not on that portion
of the judgment for which it was liable, which it does not
pay, but on the whole amount recovered against the in-
sured, we are imposing vicarious liability. And, while
vicarious liability exists in our law, it is the exception rather
than the rule.7
Vicarious liability here means that the insurer pays what is actually
the obligation of the insured. The court has stated a conclusion
without considering the logic of the opposite contention. In mak-
ing the statement that the insurer would be paying what is the
obligation of the insured the court assumes that there is an obli-
gation of the insured without considering the issue. Since the
issue is essentially whether there is or is not liability to the insured
for such interest the court has assumed its conclusion.
The final argument advanced in Sampson for the limitation of
the insurer's liability is that to construe the standard clause in any
other manner would be to give the clause an unnatural and strained
reading. This statement is subject to the same criticisms as the
ambiguity theory, i.e., the argument is basically subjective. If the
court assumes wording to be unnatural and strained without uti-
lizing objective criteria to reach that conclusion the theory must
fail as an argument.
There is an additional argument that may be added to this side
of the dichotomy. Where the insurer is required by the Insurance
Commissioner or another governing body to accept assigned risk
policies72 the obligation of the insurer should be limited. As-
signed risk policies differ materially from ordinary insurance con-
tracts. The status of a risk to be assigned is attained by demon-
strating recklessness as a motorist to a degree sufficiently material
to alert the insurance company to a possible loss, yet not
sufficiently material to earn condemnation by the state. In this
regard assigned risks are also distinguished from contracts which
70. Id. at 99.
71. California State Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 106 (1951);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O'Connor, 207 N.Y.S.2d 679, 170 N.E.2d 681 (1960).
72. "The tremendous number of automobile accidents, the demand for
the more adequate verdict . . . have created problems which the legisla-
tures have attempted to solve." 1 R. LONG, LABiuTY INSURANCE § 3.36
(1966).
result from the state's power to require financially responsible
motorists.
The limitation of the insurer's liability in the instance of an
assigned risk policy is the product of balancing considerations for
and against the extension of the insurer's liability for interest. The
acceptance by the insurer of the assigned risk policy is a direct re-
sult of the state's power to coerce cooperation from the industry.7
CONCLUSION
The determinations of rate of interest and the time at which
interest will begin are generally controlled by local statutes.7 4 A
recent Pennsylvania case 75 has held the insurer's liability to be
controlled by the standard clause rather than the local statute
which allows interest from the date of the verdict. The court has,
however, limited the decision to fact situations where interest on
the judgment will increase the insurer's total liability to a figure
above its policy limits.76 Unless the wording of the standard
clause is modified to specifically include the insurer's responsibility
for interest between the verdict and the judgment, such interest,
at least in Pennsylvania, will be the responsibility of the insured.
The decisions holding the insurer's liability restricted to the
interest which results from calculations done on the policy limits
are older and find ultimate support in the Sampson decision. On
the other hand, cases supporting the extension of the insurer's lia-
bility have the apparent support of the draftsmen of the standard
clause 77 and offer more cogent reasoning. They are in accordance
with the intention of the maker of the contract; they conform to the
exhaustive "all" of the standard clause; and they create a just con-
formity between the right to control the litigation and the liability
to pay for that right.
ARTHUR F. LOEBEN, JR.
73. See the textual discussion in conjunction with notes 17 and 33
supra.
74. Hafer v. Schauer, 429 Pa. 289, 239 A.2d 785 (1968).
75. Id. at 292, 239 A.2d 788.
76. It has long been underwriting intent as expressed in standard
provisions of policies, that the liability insurer pay "all interest on
the entire amount of any judgment" i.e., called "After Judgment
Interest" and this is so, although some courts have seen fit to rule
otherwise.
The language quoted above [the standard clause] is, with
minor editorial differences incorporated in the policies written
by companies writing about 60% of the casualty insurance country-
wide. It is believed that a substantial portion of other insurers
are also using this language.
Letter from the Insurance Rating Board, 125 Maiden Lane, New York, N.Y.,
10038 to the Dickinson Law Review, October 22, 1968, on file in the
Dickinson Law Library.
77. See note 76 supra.
